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Abstract
It is common practice in formal semantics to assume that the con-
text specifies an assignment of values to variables and that the same
variables that receive contextually salient values when they occur free
may also be bound by quantifiers and λs. These assumptions are at
work to provide a unified account of indexical and bound uses of third
person pronouns, namely an account by which the same lexical item is
involved in both uses. One apparent consequence of this approach is
that quantifiers and λs are monsters in Kaplan’s sense. We argue that
this consequence can, and should, be avoided. We explore an alterna-
tive unified account based on the idea that variable assignments occur
both as coordinates of the context and as coordinates of the circum-
stance of evaluation. The outcome is a non indexical account of free
third person pronouns and a new conception of the role and structure
of assignment functions.
1 A common practice and its consequence
It is common practice in formal semantics to assume that (i) context speci-
fies, among other pieces of information, an assignment of values to variables.
This assumption is invoked, for example, in the semantic analysis of Hittite
relative clauses (Bach and Cooper 1977), deictic pronouns (Kaplan 1989,
Heim and Kratzer 1998) and so-called “unarticulated constituents” (Stan-
ley 2000). All these analyses assume that Logical Forms (LFs) of natural
language sentences may contain free variables whose values are contextually
provided. It is also customarily assumed that (ii) the variables that receive
contextually salient values when they occur free may be bound when they
occur in the scope of quantifiers and λs bearing the same index.
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While some of the linguistic phenomena that are so analyzed also ad-
mit alternative accounts that make no reference to variables of this kind,
in the case of third person pronouns a powerful reason for making these
assumptions is that they allow one to account for their bound and indexical
occurrences by supposing that the same lexical item is involved. According
to this view, for example, (1) and (2) contain the same lexical item “hei”,
whose denotation depends on a variable assignment (although the seman-
tics of “every” requires one to consider alternative assignments to determine
truth):
(1) Hei is intelligent.
(2) Every studenti thinks hei is intelligent.
Since, in English and in several other languages, third person pronouns that
occur free are not phonologically distinct from third person pronouns that
occur bound, it is clearly desirable to adopt a uniform semantic account,
which is what assumptions (i)-(ii) above allow us to do.
If one analyzes third person pronouns in this way, a natural move (one
which, for example, Heim and Kratzer seem to agree on) is to regard the
variable assignment involved in spelling out the interpretations of the quan-
tifiers and the λ-operator as a contextual coordinate. If this move is made,
the semantic clause for universally quantified formulae should have form (3),
where cg is the variable assignment of the context c:
(3) [[∀νϕ[]M,c,w,t = 1 iff [[ϕ[]M,c′,w,t = 1 for every c
′ such that c′g differs
from cg at most for the value that c
′
g assigns to ν and c
′ agrees with
c on all other coordinates.
The semantic clause for the λ-operator should be stated along similar lines:
(4) [[λνϕ]]M,c,w,t = the function f from the domain D of M to {0, 1} such
that for every a∈D, f(a)=1 iff [[ϕ]]M,c′,w,t = 1, where c
′ is such that c′g
assigns a to ν and assigns the same values as cg to all other variables,
and c′ agrees with c on all other coordinates.
As Rabern (2012) points out, one consequence of this way of stating the
semantics of quantifiers is that they are Kaplanian monsters (Kaplan 1977).
Indeed, the universal quantifier in (3) meets Kaplan’s definition of monster,
by which a monster is any operator O such that [[Oϕ]]M,c,w,t depends on
[[ϕ]]M,c′,w,t, for some c
′ 6= c. For the same reason, the λ-operator in (4) also
qualifies as a monster.
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2 Reasons to beware
The proposal we just outlined is summed up in (5):
(5) a. variable assignments are contextual coordinates,
b. the interpretations of the universal quantifier and the λ-operator
are spelled out as in (3)-(4).
It is clear that, if one takes step (5), monsters are much more widespread in
natural languages than one might think. In addition to languages display-
ing shifted indexicals corresponding to “I”, “you”, “here”, and “yesterday”
(Schlenker 2003, Anand and Nevins 2004), which initially fueled the suppo-
sition that monsters do exist in natural languages, quantifier binding and
constructions that make use of the λ-operator would also involve monsters.
By itself, this is no objection to (5). After all, theoretical analyses of lin-
guistic phenomena may very well uncover that apparently unrelated facts
involve the same underlying linguistic operation. However, the fact that
step (5) involves a radical reclassification of the types of constructions that
contain monsters should make us wonder whether the linguistic data really
support the step or other alternatives are available.
To see how radical a step (5) is, consider (1)-(2) again:
(1) Hei is intelligent.
(2) Every studenti thinks hei is intelligent.
In view of the fact that (2) contains the pronoun “he”, which acts as an
indexical in (1), one may be tempted to accept the consequence that (2) is
a case of indexical shift after all, hence a monster. But now consider (6):
(6) John saw every man.
According to some, the interpretation of (6) is achieved by raising the quan-
tified NP “every man” to get a structure in which the quantified NP binds
the trace left behind by raising:
(7) [Every man]i John saw ti
If “every” in (7) is interpreted as involving a quantification over contextual
assignments like “∀” in (3), the consequence is that (6) is a case of context
shift, thus a monster. But (6), unlike (2), contains no expression that is
indexical or ever behaves like one! Of course, one might claim that the in-
terpretation of “every” in underlying LFs like (7), unlike the interpretation
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of “every” in the LF of (2), is not given by a clause like (3). However, this
would involve positing different devices to interpret the universal quantifi-
cations in (6) and (2). It would involve, moreover, interpreting (6) and (8)
by quantifying over contexts in (8) but not in (6):
(8) Every mani is such that John saw himi.
We take it that, other things being equal, such a consequence would be un-
desirable. Thus, taking step (5) plausibly leads one to the radical conclusion
that (6) is monstrous.
So far, we only have a reason for caution in taking step (5) (it’s a reason
against it only if one is not willing to accept (6) as a case of context shift).
Here is a reason that advises against taking the step. Let’s ask: what is
a context? Lewis (1980) characterizes the difference between contexts and
indices (or contexts and circumstances of evaluation, in Kaplan’s terms) in
this way:
A context is a location – time, place, and possible world – where
a sentence is said. It has countless features, determined by the
character of the location. An index is an n-tuple of features
of context, but not necessarily features that go together in any
possible context. Thus an index might consist of a speaker, a
time before his birth, a world where he never lived at all, and so
on. Since we are unlikely to think of all the features of context
on which truth sometimes depends, and hence unlikely to con-
struct adequately rich indices, we cannot get by without context-
dependence as well as index-dependence. Since indices but not
contexts can be shifted one feature at a time, we cannot get by
without index-dependence as well as context-dependence. (Lewis
1980, pp. 31-32).
According to this view, contexts are not abstract collections of features which
can be shifted one at a time, they are possible locations where a sentence
is uttered. Because of this, a context has an agent that utters the sentence
at a certain time in a certain place, and therefore exists at that time and
place. Now, suppose c is a context in which agent a utters sentence S at
the time t and place p in the world w. There is no such thing as a context
which is exactly like c except that the agent is b instead of a. If you change
the agent that utters S at t in p, you change the world as well. This is
why contexts, unlike indices, cannot be shifted one feature at a time. This
notion of context underlies Kaplan’s (1977, 1979) treatment of indexicals,
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in particular motivates his constraints on contexts, which are central for the
logic of the indexicals “I”, “here”, and “now”, like the one requiring that
the speaker of a context be located at the place of the context in the world
and time of the context.
Now, let’s consider again assumption (5-a). If contexts are not abstract
collection of features, what does it mean to claim that variable assignments
are contextual coordinates? A plausible answer is this. A location where
a sentence is uttered, besides being part of a world and including an agent
who utters it at a certain time t and place p, may include certain refer-
ential intentions by the agent, possibly manifested by pointings or other
gestures, which fix the referents of demonstrative expressions occurring in
the sentence. In this sense, introducing variable assignments as contextual
coordinates is simply a way of representing these collections of contextual
cues that accompany the utterance of demonstratives and contribute to fix
their referents. Suppose this picture is correct. Then, given a context c
there is no such thing as a context where the variable assignment differs
from that of c and which agrees with c on all other coordinates. If you
change the variable assignment, you change the referential intentions and
pointings of the agent that utters S at t in p, thus you change the world as
well. But then, (3) is incorrect as it stands. And, if we revise (3) by letting
the world change, we predict incorrect truth-conditions for (8), since what is
relevant for the truth of (8) is whether every man is such that John saw him
in the world of the context and not in other worlds in which the referential
intentions and demonstrations of the speakers are different. While this is
no conclusive argument against treating quantifiers as monsters, it poses a
challenge for a theory that treats quantifiers that way: such a theory should
provide a plausible formulation of how quantifiers make the context as a
whole shift which delivers the desired semantics for quantifiers.
To sum up, the above considerations give reasons to be cautious and
perhaps avoid the step of regarding quantifiers and λs as context shifters.
If this step is to be avoided, however, how can we meet the challenge of
providing a uniform semantic account of third person pronouns? What
follows is an exploration of a possible avenue.
3 Doubling the assignment
Kaplan’s semantics, more precisely some suitable extension of it, allows one
to assign truth-conditions to natural language sentences containing indexical
third person pronouns, and more generally demonstrative expressions. In-
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sofar as we regard this as one of the goals a semantics for natural languages
should achieve, the reasons for regarding variable assignments as contex-
tual coordinates are compelling: indeed, the reference of free third person
pronouns depends on the context in which they are uttered.
Yet, (5-a) by itself does not entail that quantifiers are monsters:
(5) a. variable assignments are contextual coordinates.
In Kaplan’s (1977) system, worlds and times are contextual coordinates:
they are needed to account for the meaning of indexical operators like “it is
actually the case that”, “it is now the case that”, and “yesterday”. In the
same system, modal operators and tenses require evaluating the sentence to
which they apply relative to worlds and times different from those of the
context. However, this does not qualify modal operators or tenses as mon-
sters: worlds and times, besides being contextual coordinates, also belong
to the circumstance of evaluation, and modal operators and tenses require
us to evaluate sentences at different circumstances, not at different contexts.
The same strategy may be used here to avoid treating quantifiers and the
λ-operator as context shifters. The idea, in short, is this:
• denotation is relative to a context c specifying a variable assignment
cg, and to a circumstance of evaluation including an assignment g, a
world w, and a time t.
• Quantifiers and the λ-operator alike require evaluating the formulae
to which they apply with respect to assignments minimally differing
from g (the assignment of the circumstance of evaluation).
This doesn’t explain yet how the contextual assignment plays a role in fixing
the reference of unbound third person pronouns. For this purpose, we need
an additional assumption:
• a sentence is true in a context if it is true at the time, world, and
assignment of the context.
Notice that we are departing here from the standard assumptions concerning
propositions and truth in context. In possible world semantics, it is usually
assumed that propositions are functions from world-time pairs to truth val-
ues. Hence, they are true or false relative to a world and a time, and the
truth of a sentence S in a context c is defined as truth of the proposition
expressed by S in c relative to the world and time of c. We assume in-
stead that propositions are functions from worlds-times-assignments triples
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to truth values. Hence, they are true or false relative to a world, a time and
an assignment, and the truth of a sentence S in a context c is defined as
above.
We present a formal system based on these ideas in section 4. Then, in
sections 5-6, we turn to the semantics of third person pronouns and show
how this system can account for their free and bound occurrences, and for
their interaction with modal operators, by keeping true to the idea that
quantifiers are no monsters and the semantic contribution of pronouns is
uniform across their free and bound uses. In section 7, we raise an issue that
we regard as the funda mental problem in trying to give a unified account
of bound and free uses of third person pronouns. In section 8, we present a
new version of the formal system designed to solve this problem. We sketch
our proposal in two steps: first, we present a simple version of the theory to
convey the intuitive idea underlying it, then we introduce some changes to
improve its empirical coverage. We test the theory further in section 9. In
section 10, we sum up the results of our inquiry. In Appendix 1, we state
the formal system in its final form.
4 The language IL
Symbols and formulae An intensional language IL suitable for our pur-
poses will include two types of individual variables, plain variables and pre-
suppositional variables:
x1, x2, x3, . . . (plain variables)
xm1 , x
m
2 , x
m
3 , . . . (presuppositional variables)
x
f
1 , x
f
2 , x
f
3 , . . . (presuppositional variables)
xn1 , x
n
2 , x
n
3 , . . . (presuppositional variables)
Let V be the set of plain variables and V∗ the set of variables (plain and
presuppositional). Presuppositional variables will translate English third
person pronouns. The language also includes an infinite number of n-place
predicates (for any n > 0), the truth-functional connectives, the quantifier
every, and the modal operators ✷, ✸. The definition of well-formed formula
is done as usual for the truth-functional connectives and modal operators.
If Φ and Ψ are wffs and ν ∈ V, pevery ν ΦΨq is a wff.
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Models A model for IL is a structure M =< C,W,U , T ,P,F > such that
1. C is a nonempty set (the set of contexts), where if c ∈ C,
(i) ca ∈ U (the agent of c)
(ii) ct ∈ T (the time of c)
(iii) cp ∈ P (the position of c)
(iv) cw ∈ W (the world of c)
(v) cg ∈ U
V (the assignment of c)
2. W is a nonempty set (the set of worlds)
3. U is a nonempty set (the set of individuals)
4. T is a nonempty set (the set of times)
5. P is a nonempty set (the set of positions)
6. F is a function that to every triple consisting of an n-place predicate
P
n, a world, and a time, assigns a set of n-tuples of members of U .
The definition of model is similar to the one provided by Kaplan, except for
the fact that a context also specifies an assignment to the plain individual
variables (the elements in the set V).
Denotation We assume that the denotation of an expression is relative to
a model, a context of utterance, and a circumstance of evaluation consisting
of a variable assignment, a world, and a time. We use “[[α]]M,c,g,w,t” as
short for “the denotation of α in the context c relative to the circumstance
< g,w, t >”.
Variable assignments are total functions assigning an individual to each
plain variable. The denotation of a presuppositional variable is determined
by the value of the corresponding plain variable in this way:
(9) [[xi]]M,c,g,w,t = g(xi).
(10) [[xmi ]]M,c,g,w,t = g(xi) if g(xi) is human and male in cw at ct, and it’s
undefined otherwise.
(11)
[[
x
f
i
]]
M,c,g,w,t
= g(xi) if g(xi) is human and female in cw at ct, and
it’s undefined otherwise.
(12) [[xni ]]M,c,g,w,t = g(xi) if g(xi) is not human in cw at ct, and it’s
undefined otherwise.
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Notice that, according to (10)-(12), the definedness condition for presuppo-
sitional variables requires that the individuals they denote be of the relevant
gender at the world and time of the context. We’ll come back to this feature
in sections 6-7.
The denotations of atomic formulae consisting of a predicate and the
required number of variables are specified in this way (where νi. . . νj are
variables, plain or not):
(13) Suppose [[νi]]M,c,g,w,t, . . . , [[νj ]]M,c,g,w,t are defined.
Then [[Pn(νi, . . . , νj)]]M,c,g,w,t = 1 if< [[νi]]M,c,g,w,t, . . . , [[νj ]]M,c,g,w,t >∈
F(Pn)(w)(t);
[[Pn(νi, . . . , νj)]]M,c,g,w,t = 0 if < [[νi]]M,c,g,w,t, . . . , [[νj ]]M,c,g,w,t > 6∈
F(Pn)(w)(t).
The clause for the denotation of universally quantified formulae is this
(where “g′[ν]g” is short for “assignment g′ differs from assignment g at
most for the value assigned to the variable ν”):
(14) a. [[every ν ΦΨ]]M,c,g,w,t is defined only if [[Ψ]]M,c,g′,w,t is defined
for every g′ such that g′[ν]g and [[Φ]]M,c,g′,w,t = 1.
b. if [[every ν ΦΨ]]M,c,g,w,t is defined, [[every ν ΦΨ]]M,c,g,w,t = 1 if
[[Ψ]]M,c,g′,w,t = 1 for every g
′ such that g′[ν]g and [[Φ]]M,c,g′,w,t =
1; otherwise [[every ν ΦΨ]]M,c,g,w,t = 0.
According to (14), the quantifier “every” requires the nuclear scope Ψ to
be satisfied relative to assignments of the circumstance of evaluation that
satisfy the restrictor Φ. Thus, “every” is not a monster, since it does not
require the context to shift.
Truth in context In Kaplan’s original system, truth in a context is de-
fined as truth at the circumstance that consists of the world and time of the
context. Since we assume that circumstances of evaluation are triples con-
sisting of an assignment, a world, and a time, truth in a context is defined
as truth at the assignment, world, and time of the context:
Φ is true in a context c, in the model M , if [[Φ]]M,c,cg ,cw,ct = 1,
Φ is false in a context c, in the model M, if [[Φ]]M,c,cg ,cw,ct = 0
Let’s now turn to the interpretation of third person pronouns.
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5 The interpretation of third person pronouns
We follow Heim and Kratzer’s (1998) view that the descriptive content of
third person pronouns is presupposed and that the denotation of an expres-
sion is defined only if its presupposition is met.1 We assume that occurrences
of third person pronouns bear a referential index at LF. We translate “hei”,
“shei”, and “iti” as in (15):
(15) a. hei ⇒ x
m
i
b. shei ⇒ x
f
i
c. iti ⇒ x
n
i
The LF of (1) is now translated as (16):
(1) Hei is intelligent.
(16) intelligent(xmi )
Notice that, by (10)-(12) above, the value of a variable that translates a
pronoun is determined by the variable assignment of the circumstance of
evaluation. However, by the definition of truth in a context we assumed,
the value of the variable in (16) is identified with the value determined by
the variable assignment of the context:
(17) a. [[intelligent(xmi )]]M,c,cg ,cw,ct is defined
only if [[xmi ]]M,c,cg ,cw,ct is defined
only if cg(xi) is human and male at cw, ct.
b. if [[intelligent(xmi )]]M,c,cg ,cw,ct is defined, then:
“intelligent(xmi )” is true in c, in the model M ,
if [[intelligent(xmi )]]M,c,cg ,cw,ct = 1
if cg(xi) is human and male and intelligent in cw,ct.
Now consider (18):
(18) Every mani is such that hei runs.
We assume that at LF the quantified DP “every mani” is raised and, more-
over, the quantifier “every” is adjoined to IP and bears the same index as
the DP out of which it is moved. The resulting LF for (18) is given in (19):
(19) Everyi [mani] [ti is such that hei runs]
1The notion of presupposition assumed here goes back to Strawson (1950). For a
discussion of different notions of presupposition, see Soames (1989).
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Assuming that the index on the quantifier and the noun translates as the
plain variable “xi”, the translation of (19) is (20):
(20) every xi man(xi) run(x
m
i )
According to the semantic clause for quantified formulae in (14),
(21) a. [[every xi man(xi) run(x
m
i )]]M,c,cg ,cw,ct is defined
only if [[run(xmi )]]M,c,g′,cw,ct is defined for every g
′ such that
g′[xi]cg and [[man(xi)]]M,c,g′,cw,ct = 1
only if g′(xi) is human and male at cw, ct for every g
′ such that
g′[xi]cg and [[man(xi)]]M,c,g′,cw,ct = 1
only if every individual who is a man at cw, ct is human and
male at cw, ct.
b. if [[every xi man(xi) run(x
m
i )]]M,c,cg ,cw,ct is defined, then:
“every xi man(xi) run(x
m
i )” is true in c in M ,
if [[every xi man(xi) run(x
m
i )]]M,c,cg ,cw,ct=1
if [[run(xmi )]]M,c,g′,cw,ct = 1 for every g
′ such that g′[xi]cg and
[[man(xi)]]M,c,g′,cw,ct = 1
if every individual who is a man at cw, ct is male and human at
cw, ct, and runs at cw, ct.
Notice that the presupposition of the pronoun “he”, indicated by definedness
condition (21-a), is trivially satisfied here, since every assignment g′ that
satisfies the restrictor “man(xi)” at the world and time of the context is
such that the individual that g′ assigns to xi is male and human at the
world and time of the context, thus g′ satisfies the presupposition of the
nuclear scope “run(xmi )” as well.
6 Interaction with modal operators
The interaction of free third person pronouns with modal operators follows
the general pattern pointed out by Kaplan for demonstratives. One general
feature of demonstratives, according to Kaplan, is this:
(22) the descriptive content of demonstratives holds of their referent in
the context in which they are uttered.
For example, an utterance of (23) below is true just in case the man the
speaker is pointing at when uttering (23) is such that he might have been
11
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a communist. One cannot utter (23) to say of an individual that there is a
possible circumstance in which that individual is a man and a communist.
(23) That man could have been a communist.
The same seems to be true of the descriptive content of third person pro-
nouns. One cannot utter (24) below to say of an individual that there is
a possible circumstance in which that individual is a human male and a
communist. The descriptive content of the third person pronoun “he” must
hold of its referent in the context in which (24) is uttered.
(24) He could have been a communist.
This behavior of the third person pronoun in (24) is predicted by the ac-
count we sketched. This depends on the fact that modal operators, as in
Kaplan’s system, may be assumed to shift the world of the circumstance of
evaluation, while the descriptive content of (the presuppositional variable
translating) the pronoun is required (by clauses (10)-(12)) to hold of the
pronoun’s referent in the world and time of the context. Let’s see how this
works in detail.
The semantic clause for the possibility operator is specified in this way:2
2According to the definedness condition in (25-a), the possibility operator “✸” is a
plug in Karttunen’s (1974) sense, namely it blocks the presuppositions of the sentence in
its scope. This is in contrast with Karttunen’s observation that modals are holes, namely
they turn the presuppositions of the sentence in their scope into presuppositions of the
matrix sentence. For example, sentence (i) below inherits the presupposition that John
talked before reaching maturity from the embedded sentence:
(i) it is possible that John stopped talking upon reaching maturity.
Notice, however, that, although modals expressing epistemic possibility usually behave
as holes, modals expressing other types of possibility may not be holes (indeed, Soames
1989 restricts the assumption that modals are holes to epistemic modals). For example,
(ii) does not require that in the world of the context every unicorn talks before reaching
maturity:
(ii) It is possible that every unicorn stops talking upon reaching maturity.
The possibility operator in (ii) seems to be an operator of “informational” possibility,
which is understood relative to what Kratzer (1981) calls an “informational conversational
background”, namely a background that “represents the intentional content of sources of
information” (where sources of information may be stories, books, reports, testimony etc.).
One may adopt the definedness condition in (25-a) as a first approximation for this sense
of “possible”.
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(25) a. [[✸ϕ]]M,c,g,w,t is defined only if [[ϕ]]M,c,g,w′,t is defined for all w
′ ∈
W that are accessible3 from w.
b. if [[✸ϕ]]M,c,g,w,t is defined, then:
[[✸ϕ]]M,c,g,w,t = 1 if [[ϕ]]M,c,g,w′,t = 1, for some w
′ ∈ W that is
accessible from w;
[[✸ϕ]]M,c,g,w,t = 0 if [[ϕ]]M,c,g,w′,t = 0, for all w
′ ∈ W that are
accessible from w.
Assuming that the LF for (24) is translated as (26), we get the desired
truth-conditions in (27) by which the referent of the pronoun is required to
be human and male at the world and time of the context:
(26) ✸communist(xmi )
(27) a. [[✸communist(xmi )]]M,c,cg ,cw,ct is defined
only if [[xmi ]]M,c,cg ,w′,ct is defined for all w
′ ∈ W that are acces-
sible from cw
only if cg(xi) is human and male in cw,ct.
b. if [[✸communist(xmi )]]M,c,cg ,cw,ct is defined,then:
“✸communist(xmi )” is true in a context c in the model M
if [[✸communist(xmi )]]M,c,cg ,cw,ct = 1
if [[communist(xmi )]]M,c,cg ,w′,ct = 1 for some w
′ ∈ W that is
accessible from cw
if cg(xi) is human and male in cw,ct and is a communist in w
′,
ct for some w
′ ∈ W that is accessible from cw.
Free third person pronouns, and more generally demonstratives, share
(22) with pure indexicals. For example, the first person pronoun “I” (a pure
indexical) refers to the speaker of the context in which it is uttered. One
cannot utter (28) to say of an individual that there is a possible circumstance
where that individual is the speaker and is a communist:
(28) I might be a communist.
In Kaplan’s theory, this is accounted for by assuming that pure indexicals
directly refer to some features of the context of utterance. For example, the
semantic clause for “I” is the following:
3We assume that the context of utterance specifies an accessibility relation which deter-
mines the modal base for the modal operator, along the lines of Kratzer (1977, 1978, 1981).
We introduce the accessibility relation as a contextual coordinate in the final version of
the formal system in Appendix 1.
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(29) [[I]]M,c,g,w,t = ca.
If we combine (29) with the account we are exploring here, however, the
denotations of demonstratives and pure indexicals are anchored to the con-
text of utterance by different means, and feature (22) is also accounted for
differently. In our theory, demonstratives, in particular free third person
pronouns, are variables whose referent is determined by a contextual assign-
ment in virtue of the definition of truth in a context, which identifies the
assignment of the circumstance with that of the context. Moreover, their
descriptive content is presupposed to hold of their referent in the context
of utterance. On the other hand, according to (29), pure indexicals like “I”
are not variables, but constants which, in every context c, refer to some
coordinate of c, for example “I” refers to the agent of c.
One might argue that this difference between pure indexicals like “I”
and third person pronouns is legitimated by the observation that third per-
son pronouns, unlike pure indexicals, may be bound by quantifiers, and, in
this sense, they display a variable-like behavior that pure indexicals fail to
display. Indeed, “I” in (30) cannot be bound by the quantified NP “every
man”:
(30) every man thinks I am a communist.
However, lack of quantifier binding for pure indexicals might also be ex-
plained by syntactic means. Presumably, when pronouns are bound, the
Phi features (gender, number, and person) of the binder and of the bindee
must agree,4 and this is sufficient to rule out the binding in (30), since “ev-
ery man” is third person and “I” is first person. If this is the case, then one
possibility is that “I” is translated as a variable as well and its semantics
is specified thus (see also Santorio 2012 for a proposal that treats “I” as a
variable):
(31) I ⇒ xsi .
(32) [[xsi ]]M,c,g,w,t = g(xi) if g(xi) = ca, and it’s undefined otherwise.
Here, we leave it open whether first person pronouns should be treated as
constants, as in (29), or as variables, as in (31)-(32).5
4For this assumption, see Kratzer (1998, 2009) and Heim (2008).
5See Sudo (2012, 2013a) for further discussion.
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7 The fundamental problem
The semantics for third person pronouns proposed in section 5 is in essence
the account of free third person pronouns proposed by Cooper (1983). Ac-
cording to Cooper, these pronouns have indexical presuppositions, namely
they presuppose that their descriptive content is satisfied by their referent
in the actual world.
Cooper restricts the indexical presuppositions to (non anaphoric) free
third person pronouns and claims that bound pronouns do not trigger them.
One consequence of the unified account proposed here, however, is that we
expect them to be met by bound third person pronouns as well. Yanovich
(2010) has provided some examples of bound pronouns interacting with at-
titude operators showing that their gender presuppositions may be indexical
in Cooper’s sense. However, as Yanovich observes, there are also cases in
which an attitude operator or a conditional antecedent succeeds in block-
ing the requirement that the descriptive content be met in the actual world
(see Sudo 2012 for discussion). The problem with the proposal sketched so
far is that it predicts that the gender presuppositions of pronouns, whether
bound or free, should always be satisfied by their referent in the world of
the context.
We may see why this is a problem in the case of modal operators by
considering (33):
(33) It is possible that every unicorni is such that iti talks.
Clearly, in the case of (33), the gender presuppositions of the pronoun “iti”,
do not have to be satisfied by any individual in the actual world. But our
theory does not predict this. According to the proposal in section 5,
(34) a. [[✸ every xi unicorn(xi) talk(x
n
i )]]M,c,cg ,cw,ct is defined
only if, for all w that are accessible from cw,
[[every xi unicorn(xi) talk(x
n
i )]]M,c,cg ,w,ct is defined
only if, for all w that are accessible from cw, [[talk(x
n
i )]]M,c,g′,w,ct
is defined for every g′ such that g′[xi]cg and
[[unicorn(xi)]]M,c,g′,w,ct = 1
only if, for all w that are accessible from cw, every individual
which is a unicorn at w, ct is non human at cw, ct.
b. If [[✸ every xi unicorn(xi) talk(x
n
i )]]M,c,cg ,cw,ct is defined, then:
“✸ every xi unicorn(xi) talk(x
n
i )” is true in c in M ,
if [[✸ every xi unicorn(xi) talk(x
n
i )]]M,c,cg ,cw,ct = 1
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if [[every xi unicorn(xi) talk(x
n
i )]]M,c,cg ,w,ct = 1 for some w
that is accessible from cw,
if for some w that is accessible from cw, [[talk(x
n
i )]]M,c,g′,w,ct = 1
for every g′ such that g′[xi]cg and [[unicorn(xi)]]M,g′,w,ct = 1
if, for some w that is accessible from cw, every individual that
is a unicorn at w, ct is non human at cw, ct, and talks at w, ct.
This prediction is incorrect since it requires that, for (33) to be true non
vacuously, there must be some non human individuals in the actual world
such that there is some world in which they are unicorns and talk.
Two observations are in order concerning this problem. The first is
that we cannot solve it simply by modifying the semantics of third person
pronouns and requiring that their descriptive content be met at the world
and time of the circumstance. This is a natural way to extend Kratzer
and Heim’s treatment of the presuppositions of third person pronouns to
an intensional semantics (see Sudo 2012 for an explicit formulation), and in
our system it would amount to assuming the following interpretation for the
presuppositional variables translating third person pronouns:
(35) [[xmi ]]M,c,g,w,t = g(xi) if g(xi) is human and male in w at t, and it’s
undefined otherwise.
(36)
[[
x
f
i
]]
M,c,g,w,t
= g(xi) if g(xi) is human and female in w at t, and
it’s undefined otherwise.
(37) [[xni ]]M,c,g,w,t = g(xi) if g(xi) is not human in w at t, and it’s unde-
fined otherwise.
However, this interpretation predicts that one should be able to point at
Fabio and utter (38) below to claim that there is some possible circumstance
in which he is a woman. The problem is that (38) is not felicitous in a context
of this kind.
(38) shei might have been a woman.
The second observation is that the problem posed by (33) is not generated
by our assumption that the variable assignment is both a coordinate of the
context and a coordinate of the circumstance of evaluation. Indeed, consider
the monstrous counterpart of (14):
(39) a. [[every ν ΦΨ]]M,c,w,t is defined only if [[Ψ]]M,c′,w,t is defined for
every c′ that differs from c at most because [[ν]]M,c′,w,t 6= [[ν]]M,c,w,t
and such that [[Φ]]M,c′,w,t = 1.
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b. if [[every ν ΦΨ]]M,c,w,t is defined, then:
[[every ν ΦΨ]]M,c,w,t = 1 if [[Ψ]]M,c′,w,t = 1 for every c
′ that
differs from c at most because [[ν]]M,c′,w,t 6= [[ν]]M,c,w,t and such
that [[Φ]]M,c′,w,t = 1; otherwise [[every ν ΦΨ]]M,c,w,t = 0.
If the assignment is only present as a contextual coordinate, as the mon-
strous treatment of quantifiers would have it, we still have the option, when
specifying the interpretation of third person pronouns, of requiring that their
descriptive content be met at the time and world of the context or at the
time and world of the circumstance. In the first case, the monstrous theory
makes the same wrong prediction about (33) as the proposal in section 5, in
the second case it makes the same wrong prediction as (36) concerning (38).
In other words, what generates the problem here is the attempt to provide
a uniform semantics for third person pronouns whether bound or free, not
the choice of a non monstrous account of quantifiers over a monstrous one.
This is then the fundamental problem that arises for any account that
treats bound and (non anaphoric) free uses of third person pronouns as
occurrences of the same lexical items. On the one hand, (non anaphoric)
free uses provide compelling reasons to assume that the descriptive content
of the pronoun should be met in the world of the context. On the other
hand, bound uses show that this need not be the case.
8 Looking for a solution
The theory we propose in this section is our attempt to solve the fundamental
problem. We sketch our proposal in two steps: first we present a simple
version of the theory to convey the intuitive idea underlying it, then we
introduce some changes to improve its empirical coverage.
8.1 Modal localization of the assignment
Consider (40):
(40) Every studenti is such that hei passed the exam.
Intuitively, when we utter (40), we are considering individuals that inhabit
the world of the context of utterance and are students in that world. If the
compositional interpretation of (40) is achieved by quantifying over alter-
native assignments, the truth-conditions for (40) may be spelled out thus:
every alternative assignment that assigns to the variable bound by the quan-
tifier an individual that inhabits the world of the context cw and is a student
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in cw must also be an assignment that makes the translation of “hei passed
the exam” true in cw.
Now consider (33) again:
(33) It is possible that every unicorni is such that iti talks.
Intuitively, when we utter (33), we are not considering individuals that in-
habit the world of the context of utterance and are unicorns in that world.
We consider, instead, individuals that inhabit a possible world which may
differ from the world of the context and that are unicorns in that world. If
the compositional interpretation of (33) is achieved by quantifying over al-
ternative assignments, the truth-conditions for (33) may be spelled out thus:
there must be some world w such that every alternative assignment that as-
signs to the variable bound by the quantifier an individual that inhabits w
and is a unicorn in w is also an assignment that makes the translation of
“iti talks” true in w.
One moral we may draw from this picture is that assignments are modally
localized: by this, we mean that an assignment doesn’t just assign individu-
als to variables, but also carries information about which world is inhabited
by these individuals. We formalize this idea by assuming that variable as-
signments are parameterized to possible worlds, and we write gw for an
assignment parameterized to the possible world w. We assume the following
principle of localization:
(41) for every ν ∈ V, gw(ν) is an individual inhabiting w.
We keep to our previous assumption that the assignment is initialized by the
context, i.e. at the beginning of the evaluation process the assignment of
the circumstance is the same as the contextual assignment. However, since
assignments are now parameterized to a possible world, we need to say how
the world parameter of the contextual assignment is set up. We make the
natural assumption that the contextual assignment is parameterized to the
world of the context, that is, the assignment of context c is ccwg . Truth in a
context is now defined thus:
• Φ is true in a context c, in the model M , if [[Φ]]M,c,ccwg ,cw,ct = 1
• Φ is false in a context c, in the model M, if [[Φ]]M,c,ccwg ,cw,ct = 0
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8.2 Assignment shifts
Now that assignments are parameterized to possible worlds, we need to be
more explicit on the possible ways the assignment coordinate of the circum-
stance can be shifted. As before, the assignment will be operated upon by
quantifiers (and the λ-operator), the only assignment-shifters in our sys-
tem. We will now state the semantic clauses for quantified DPs and modal
operators by following these assumptions:
• a quantifier binding a variable ν introduces variants of the input as-
signment that (i) may differ from it with respect to the value of ν and
(ii) are parameterized to the world of the circumstance of evaluation
w;
• modal operators only shift the world -coordinate of the circumstance
of evaluation, while they do nothing to the assignment-coordinate of
the circumstance.
Constraint (ii) on the output assignments of quantifiers is supposed to ac-
count for the observation that a quantified DP in the scope of a modal op-
erator has a domain which is restricted to individuals inhabiting the world
introduced by the modal operator.
In stating the semantic clause for the universal quantifier based on these
assumptions, some care is needed. In principle, the input assignment for a
quantifier need not be parameterized to the world of the context, since, by
(ii) above, another quantifier might have parameterized it to the world of
the circumstance of evaluation. For example, in (42) below, the quantifier
“every female unicorn”, if interpreted in the scope of the quantifier “every
male unicorn”, takes an input assignment parameterized to the world of the
circumstance:
(42) It is possible that every male unicorn loves every female unicorn.
However, the input assignment for a quantifier need not be parameterized
to the world of the circumstance either, since a modal operator might have
shifted the world of the circumstance, while the input assignment might
have remained anchored to the world of the context. This is the case for the
quantifier “every male unicorn” in (42), if understood as taking scope over
“every female unicorn”.
We take these options into account, by specifying the clause for univer-
sally quantified formulae as in (43) (where @ is a world and the expression
“g′w[ν]g@” is short for “g′w is the assignment identical to g@ except for the
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fact that (i) the world parameter of g′w is w and (ii) the individual g′w(ν)
may differ from the individual g@(ν)”):
(43) a. [[every ν ΦΨ]]M,c,g@,w,t is defined only if [[Ψ]]M,c,g′w,w,t is defined
for every g′w such that g′w[ν]g@ and [[Φ]]M,c,g′w,w,t = 1.
b. if [[every ν ΦΨ]]M,c,g@,w,t is defined, [[every ν ΦΨ]]M,c,g@,w,t =
1 if [[Ψ]]M,c,g′w,w,t = 1 for every g
′w such that g′w[ν]g@ and
[[Φ]]M,c,g′w,w,t = 1; otherwise [[every ν ΦΨ]]M,c,g@,w,t = 0.
The clause for the possibility operator will be essentially the same as the one
we gave in section 6, the only difference being that the assignment coordinate
is now modally parameterized:
(44) a. [[✸ϕ]]M,c,g@,w,t is defined only if [[ϕ]]M,c,g@,w′,t is defined for all
w′ ∈ W that are accessible from w.
b. if [[✸ϕ]]M,c,g@,w,t is defined, then:
[[✸ϕ]]M,c,g@,w,t = 1 if [[ϕ]]M,c,g@,w′,t = 1, for some w
′ ∈ W that
is accessible from w;
[[✸ϕ]]M,c,g@,w,t = 0 if [[ϕ]]M,c,g@,w′,t = 0, for all w
′ ∈ W that are
accessible from w.
8.3 Adherence of the presupposition to the world of the as-
signment
Another essential ingredient of the solution that we propose is what we call
“adherence of the presupposition to the world of the assignment”, by which
we mean (45):
(45) If the reference of a pronoun pron is determined by assignment g
w,
the presupposition triggered by pron must be met in w, that is, the
individual gw(xn) must satisfy the relevant presupposition in w.
Formally, principle (45) is captured by the following reformulation of the
clauses for the denotation of the presuppositional variables translating third
person pronouns:
(46) [[xmi ]]M,c,g@,w,t = g
@(xi) if g
@(xi) is human and male in @, and it’s
undefined otherwise.
(47)
[[
x
f
i
]]
M,c,g@,w,t
= g@(xi) if g
@(xi) is human and female in @, and
it’s undefined otherwise.
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(48) [[xni ]]M,c,g@,w,t = g
@(xi) if g
@(xi) is non human in @, and it’s unde-
fined otherwise.
8.4 Indexical vs. shifty behaviour of pronominal presuppo-
sitions
It’s easy to show that the revised system based on modally parameterized
assignments can still account for the indexical behaviour of pronominal pre-
suppositions described by Cooper (1983), while enabling one to face the
empirical challenge raised by quantifiers in modal contexts which was dis-
cussed in section 7.
Let’s begin with the case of the indexical presupposition in the scope
of a modal operator corresponding to our example (24), whose LF we have
assumed to be translated as in (26):
(24) Hei could have been a communist.
(26) ✸communist(xmi )
We now predict the following truth conditions for an utterance of (24) in a
context c, by which the referent of the pronoun is correctly required to be
human and male in the world of c:
(49) a. [[✸communist(xmi )]]M,c,ccwg ,cw,ct is defined only if
[[communist(xmi )]]M,c,ccwg ,w′,ct is defined for all accessible w
′ ∈
W only if [[xmi ]]M,c,ccwg ,w′,ct is defined for all accessible w
′ ∈ W
only if ccwg (xi) is human and male in cw,ct.
b. If [[✸communist(xmi )]]M,c,ccwg ,cw,ct is defined, then:
“✸communist(xmi )” is true in c in the model M
if [[✸communist(xmi )]]M,c,ccwg ,cw,ct = 1
if [[communist(xmi )]]M,c,ccwg ,w′,ct = 1 for some accessible w
′ ∈ W
if [[xmi ]]M,c,ccwg ,w′,ct ∈ [[communist]]M,c,ccwg ,w′,ct for some accessi-
ble w′ ∈ W
if ccwg (xi) is human and male in cw,ct and is communist in w
′,
ct for some accessible w
′ ∈ W.
Let’s now turn to the shifty case provided by quantifiers in the semantic
scope of modal operators, as shown by the example (33):
(33) It is possible that every unicorni is such that iti talks.
According to the present proposal,
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(50) a. [[✸ every xi unicorn(xi) talk(x
n
i )]]M,c,ccwg ,cw,ct is defined only if,
for all accessible w, [[talk(xni )]]M,c,gw,w,ct is defined for every g
w
such that gw[xi]c
cw
g and [[unicorn(xi)]]M,c,gw,w,ct = 1
only if, for all accessible w, every individual which is a unicorn
at w, ct is non human at w, ct.
b. if [[✸ every xi unicorn(xi) talk(x
n
i )]]M,c,ccwg ,cw,ct is defined, then:
“✸ every xi unicorn(xi) talk(x
n
i )” is true in c, in the model
M , if [[✸ every xi unicorn(xi) talk(x
n
i )]]M,c,ccwg ,cw,ct = 1
if [[every xi unicorn(xi) talk(x
n
i )]]M,c,ccwg ,w,ct = 1 for some ac-
cessible w
if, for some accessible w, [[talk(xni )]]M,c,gw,w,ct = 1 for every g
w
such that gw[xi]c
cw
g and [[unicorn(xi)]]M,c,gw,w,ct = 1
if, for some accessible w, every individual that is a unicorn at
w, ct is non human at w, ct, and talks at w, ct.
Thus, the new proposal correctly captures the modally bound presupposition
of (33), according to which unicorns are only presupposed to be non human
in the possible world introduced by the possibility operator, not in the world
of the context.
8.5 Modal localization of the assignment again
We are not done yet. We made the following assumptions to account for
the fact that the presuppositions of bound pronouns need not be satisfied
at the world of the context: (i) variable assignments are parameterized to a
world, and (ii) the denotations of the presuppositional variables “xmi ”, “x
f
i ”,
“xni ” translating third person pronouns are only defined if the values of the
corresponding plain variables are, respectively, male, female, neither male
nor female at that world. Since quantifiers identify the world parameter
of the assignment with the world of the circumstance of evaluation, the
denotation of presuppositional variables need not be defined relative to the
world of the context when these variables are in the scope of quantifiers. As
we saw, this is a desired consequence in the case of (33) above. However,
the proposal we just sketched needs to be improved. Here’s why.
Let’s assume that intensional operators like “according to x”, on a par
with modal operators, shift the world coordinate of the circumstance, but
not the world of the assignment. Now, suppose that, while we know that
Fabio is male, Jones falsely believes that Fabio is female. Our current pro-
posal correctly predicts that sentence (51) below cannot be uttered felic-
itously in this context to report that, according to Jones, Fabio works in
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Toulouse:
(51) According to Jones, she (pointing at Fabio) works in Toulouse.
The proposal makes this prediction, since it requires that the presupposition
of the pronoun “she” in (51) be met at the world of the assignment, which,
in this case, is the world of the context.6 Consider, however, sentence (52):
(52) According to Jones, every student loves her (pointing at Fabio).
Again, this sentence cannot be uttered felicitously against the background
we considered, in which Jones wrongly believes that Fabio is female. Yet, our
current proposal incorrectly predicts that (52) should be felicitous if uttered
against that background. In short, the reason is this. In (52), the quantifier
“every student” is in the scope of the intensional operator “according to
Jones”, thus the alternative assignments introduced by the quantifier are
parameterized to the worlds introduced by the intensional operator, namely
to Jones’s epistemic alternatives. For this reason, the pronoun “her” ends up
being evaluated relative to assignments parameterized to Jones’s epistemic
alternatives. As a consequence, the presupposition of “her” is satisfied,
since, in the context at hand, Jones believes that Fabio is female, thus (52)
is incorrectly predicted to be felicitous in that context. To see how the
problem arises in detail, let’s assume that “according to Jones” is translated
in IL by the operator Bj with the following semantics:
(53) a. [[Bjϕ]]M,c,g@,w,t is defined only if [[ϕ]]M,c,g@,w′,t is defined for ev-
ery w′ ∈ W which is a belief world of Jones in w.
b. If [[Bjϕ]]M,c,g@,w,t is defined, then:
[[Bjϕ]]M,c,g@,w,t = 1 if [[ϕ]]M,c,g@,w′,t = 1, for every w
′ ∈ W which
is a belief world of Jones in w;
[[Bjϕ]]M,c,g@,w,t = 0 if [[ϕ]]M,c,g@,w′,t = 0, for some w
′ ∈ W which
is is a belief world of Jones in w.
Sentence (52) is now translated as (54):
(54) Bj every xi student(xi) loves(x
f
k , xi)
6Here, we are implicitly assuming that, if a proposition p must be true in the world
of the context in order for a sentence S to have a truth value, then in order for S to be
felicitously utterable in that context, the conversational participants must take for granted
that p. We make this assumption explicit in section 9.2 by stating the bridge principle in
(94).
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According to our current proposal, (54) is defined under the following con-
ditions:
(55)
[[
Bj every xi student(xi) loves(x
f
k , xi)
]]
M,c,c
cw
g ,cw,ct
is defined
only if
[[
every xi student(xi) loves(x
f
k , xi)
]]
M,c,c
cw
g ,w′,ct
is defined,
for every w′ ∈ W which is a belief world of Jones in cw
only if
[[
loves(xfk , xi)
]]
M,c,gw
′
,w′,ct
is defined for every gw
′
such that
gw
′
[xi]c
cw
g and [[student(xi)]]M,c,gw′ ,w′,ct = 1 , for every w
′ ∈ W which
is a belief world of Jones in cw
only if
[[
x
f
k
]]
M,c,gw
′
,w′,ct
is defined for every w′ ∈ W which is a belief
world of Jones in cw
only if gw
′
(xk) is female in w
′ for every w′ ∈ W which is a belief
world of Jones in cw.
Thus, we predict that the presupposition of the female pronoun “her” in
(52) must be met in Jones’s belief worlds, contrary to what is the case.7
As (55) shows, the problem originates from the fact that our system, as
it is, requires that the presuppositions of pronouns in the scope of quantifiers
must be met at the world of the circumstance not only when these pronouns
are bound, as in (33), but also when they are free, as in (52). Thus, in
configurations of type (56) below, where the pronoun is free and is in the
scope of a quantifier, we predict that the presupposition of the pronoun must
be met at the worlds introduced by the intensional operator:
7There is a further problem with the formulation of the semantic clause for universal
quantifiers we proposed in (43), as pointed out to us by Philippe Schlenker (p.c.). By
our principle of localization in (41), given an assignment g@, there may be no such thing
as the assignment g′
w
which, besides possibly differing from g@ for the world parameter,
agrees with g@ on the values assigned to all variables except possibly for the value of a
variable ν:
(41) Principle of localization: for every ν ∈ V, gw(ν) is an individual inhabiting w.
Indeed, suppose that a inhabits @, but not w, and, moreover, g@ assigns a to a variable ν′
different from ν. Then, given that, by (41), any assignment g′
w
that is a variant of g@ with
respect to the value of ν must assign to ν′ an individual inhabiting w, no such assignment
g′
w
may differ from g@ only for the value it assigns to ν. The unwanted consequence
of this is that (i) below may turn out to be vacuously true because there is some world
inhabited by unicorns but not by an individual assigned by the context to the variable xj :
(i) It is possible that every unicorni is such that iti is not a unicorn.
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(56) Intensional operator [quantifier . . . free pronoun . . . ]
But (52) shows that this prediction is not correct. In order to avoid this
incorrect prediction, the formal system must be revised in such a way that
only the denotations of bound presuppositional variables are required to be
defined relative to the world of the circumstance of evaluation. This is what
we set out to do now.
First, we assume that assignments are not directly parameterized to a
world, but to a function s from plain variables to worlds:
(57) gs
Thus, an assignment, besides assigning an individual to each plain variable,
also contains “modal” information concerning which world is associated with
which variable. For short, let’s call the function s from plain variables to
worlds the “modal component” of the assignment function. We assume that
the assignment provided by the context is specified thus:
(58) csg, where s(ν) = cw for every ν ∈ V.
Namely, the modal component of the contextual assignment associates each
variable with the actual world. The principle of localization is now restated
as follows:
(59) For every ν ∈ V and every function s from V to W, gs(ν) is an
individual inhabiting s(ν).
This means that, as before, the contextual assignment assigns to each plain
variable an individual inhabiting the world of the context, but this is now
obtained by parameterizing the assignment to a function from variables to
worlds, rather than to a world directly.
The denotation of presuppositional variables is now restated thus:
(60) [[xmi ]]M,c,gs,w,t = g
s(xi) if g
s(xi) is human and male in s(xi), and it’s
undefined otherwise.
(61)
[[
x
f
i
]]
M,c,gs,w,t
= gs(xi) if g
s(xi) is human and female in s(xi), and
it’s undefined otherwise.
(62) [[xni ]]M,c,gs,w,t = g
s(xi) if g
s(xi) is non human in s(xi), and it’s un-
defined otherwise.
The clauses for the possibility operator “✸” and the operator “Bj” translat-
ing “according to Jones” stay the same, except for the fact that denotation
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is now relative to an assignment gs parameterized to a function s from plain
variables to worlds.
Let the expression “g′s[νi→w,...,νj→w
′][νi, . . . , νj ]g
s” be short for “the as-
signment g′s[νi→w,...,νj→w
′] is identical to gs except for the fact that (i)
g′
s[νi→w,...,νj→w
′] may differ from gs because its modal component assigns
the world w to the variable νi, . . . , and the world w
′ to the variable νj ,
and (ii) g′s[νi→w,...,νj→w
′] may differ from gs for the individuals assigned to
νi, . . . , νj”. We may now restate the clause for the quantifier “every” as
follows:
(63) a. [[every ν ΦΨ]]M,c,gs,w,t is defined only if [[Ψ]]M,c,g′s[ν→w],w,t is de-
fined for every g′s[ν→w] such that
g′
s[ν→w][ν]gs and [[Φ]]
M,c,g′s[ν→w],w,t
= 1.
b. if [[every ν ΦΨ]]M,c,gs,w,t is defined, then:
[[every ν ΦΨ]]M,c,gs,w,t = 1 if [[Ψ]]M,c,g′s[ν→w],w,t = 1 for every
g′
s[ν→w] such that g′s[ν→w][ν]gs and [[Φ]]
M,c,g′s[ν→w],w,t
= 1; oth-
erwise [[every ν ΦΨ]]M,c,gs,w,t = 0.
One consequence of (63) is that the quantifier now introduces variants of the
input assignment where only the values of variables bound by the quantifier
are localized at the world of the circumstance. This yields the desired result
that only the denotations of bound presuppositional variables are required
to be defined relative to the world of the circumstance of evaluation.8 In-
deed, in the case of (52), repeated below with its IL translation in (54), the
presupposition of “her” must now be satisfied relative to the world of the
context and not in Jones’s belief worlds:
(52) According to Jones, every student loves her (pointing at Fabio).
(54) Bj (every xi student(xi) loves(x
f
k , xi))
(64)
[[
Bj (every xi student(xi) loves(x
f
k , xi))
]]
M,c,csg ,cw,ct
is defined
8Notice that the problem pointed out for the previous version of our proposal in relation
to (i) no longer arises:
(i) It is possible that every unicorni is such that iti is not a unicorn.
What is required now for (i) to be true in a context c is that this condition be met: there
is a world w such that every assignment which assigns to the variable xi an individual
inhabiting w that is a unicorn in w, and which otherwise agrees with the assignment of
the context on assigning to other variables individuals inhabiting cw, also assigns to xi an
individual that is not a unicorn in w. Clearly, no such condition may be satisfied.
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only if
[[
every xi student(xi) loves(x
f
k , xi)
]]
M,c,csg ,w
′,ct
is defined, for
every w′ ∈ W which is a belief world of Jones
only if
[[
loves(xfk , xi)
]]
M,c,gs[xi→w
′],w′,ct
is defined for every gs[xi→w
′]
such that gs[xi→w
′][xi]c
s
g and [[student(xi)]]M,c,gs[xi→w′],w′,ct = 1, for
every w′ ∈ W which is a belief world of Jones
only if
[[
x
f
k
]]
M,c,gs[xi→w
′],w′,ct
is defined for every w′ ∈ W which is a
belief world of Jones
only if gs[xi→w
′](xk) is human and female in s[xi → w
′](xk) for every
w′ ∈ W which is a belief world of Jones
only if csg(xk) is female in s(xk) = cw.
According to the definedness condition which has thus been derived, (52)
imposes a constraint on the context by which the denotation of “her” under
the contextual assignment must be female in the world of the context.
9 Testing the theory further
9.1 Extension to other intensional operators
Our theory straightforwardly accounts for the behaviour of third person
pronouns in (65) (based on Cooper 1983) and (66) (from Sudo 2012):
(65) Context: we know that Fabio is a man, but Jones believes that
Fabio is a woman.
a. ??Jones believes that shei (pointing at Fabio) is a university pro-
fessor.
b. ??Jones doubts that shei (pointing at Fabio) is a university pro-
fessor.
c. ??Jones hopes that shei (pointing at Fabio) is a university pro-
fessor.
d. ??Jones asked if shei (pointing at Fabio) is a university professor.
e. ??Jones wonders if shei (pointing at Fabio) is a university profes-
sor.
(66) Context: John met some new people today and said that some of
them are students and some of them are professors. We do not know
if he is right about that.
a. John believes that every studenti likes herselfi.
b. John doubts that every studenti likes herselfi.
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c. John hopes that every studenti likes herselfi.
d. John asked if every studenti likes herselfi.
e. John wonders if every studenti likes herselfi.
Assuming that the semantics of “believe” is similar to that of “according
to”, and is spelled out as in (67) below, the infelicity of (65-a) is explained
on a par with the infelicity of (51): “shei” is free in the LF of (65-a), thus the
denotation of (the presuppositional variable translating) “shei” is defined in
a context only if the contextual assignment assigns to the plain variable xi
an individual who is female in the world of the context. Since the contextual
assignment assigns Fabio to xi and we know that Fabio is male, we correctly
predict that (65-a) cannot be uttered felicitously in the context described in
(65).
(67) a. [[believe(τ, ϕ)]]M,c,gs,w,t is defined only if [[ϕ]]M,c,gs,w′,t is defined,
for all w′ ∈ W such that w′ is a belief world of [[τ ]]M,c,gs,w,t in
w.
b. if [[believe(τ, ϕ)]]M,c,gs,w,t is defined, then:
[[believe(τ, ϕ)]]M,c,gs,w,t = 1 if [[ϕ]]M,c,gs,w′,t = 1, for all w
′ ∈ W
such that w′ is a belief world of [[τ ]]M,c,gs,w,t in w;
[[believe(τ, ϕ)]]M,c,gs,w,t = 0 if [[ϕ]]M,c,gs,w′,t = 0, for some w
′ ∈
W such that w′ is a belief world of [[τ ]]M,c,gs,w,t in w.
An appropriate possible world semantics for “doubt”, “hope”, “ask”, and
“wonder” will account in the same way for (65-b)-(65-e), since, like “believe”,
these verbs do not introduce variants of the input assignment, thus the
presupposition of “she”, again, must be satisfied relative to the world of the
context.
On the other hand, for (66-a) we predict (what is observed by Sudo)
that the presupposition of “herself” must be satisfied in John’s belief worlds,
namely (66-a) is only felicitous in contexts in which John believes that every
student is female. Here’s why. As Sudo points out, the context in (66)
indicates that the quantifier “every studenti” is to be read de dicto. Thus,
(66-a) will be translated as (68):
(68) believe(j, every xi student(xi) loves(x
f
i , xi))
Formula (68) is defined in a context under these conditions:
(69)
[[
believe(j, every xi student(xi) loves(x
f
i , xi))
]]
M,c,csg ,cw,ct
is defined
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only if
[[
every xi student(xi) loves(x
f
i , xi)
]]
M,c,csg ,w
′,ct
is defined, for
every w′ ∈ W which is a belief world of Jones in cw
only if
[[
loves(xfi , xi)
]]
M,c,gs[xi→w
′],w′,ct
is defined for every gs[xi→w
′]
such that gs[xi→w
′][xi]c
s
g and [[student(xi)]]M,c,gs[xi→w′],w′,ct = 1, for
every w′ ∈ W which is a belief world of Jones in cw
only if
[[
x
f
i
]]
M,c,gs[xi→w
′],w′,ct
is defined for every gs[xi→w
′] such that
gs[xi→w
′][xi]c
s
g and [[student(xi)]]M,c,gs[xi→w′],w′,ct = 1, for every w
′ ∈
W which is a belief world of Jones in cw
only if for every gs[xi→w
′] such that gs[xi→w
′][xi]c
s
g and
[[student(xi)]]M,c,gs[xi→w′],w′,ct = 1, g
s[xi→w
′](xi) is female in s[xi →
w′](xi), for every w
′ ∈ W which is a belief world of Jones in cw
only if every individual who is a student in w′ is female in w′, for
every w′ which is a belief world of Jones in cw.
The interpretation of (66-b)-(66-e) is accounted for in a similar way, under
a suitable analysis of the intensional verbs occurring in these sentences.
Yet another case our theory accounts for is the following, based on
Yanovich (2010):
(70) Context: we know that Andrew, a music teacher, does not have any
students at the moment, but Andrew himself mistakenly thinks that
he has one girl student.
a. According to Andrewj , hisj studenti pushes herselfi
b. *According to Andrewj , hisj studenti pushes himselfi.
As indicated in (70-a)-(70-b), we may only refer to the imaginary female
student of Andrew’s with a feminine pronoun. The use of a feminine pronoun
is accounted for by assuming that “hisj studenti” is in the scope of the
intensional operator “according to Andrew” and is a quantificational DP
introducing alternative assignments parameterized to a modal component
that assigns a belief world of Andrew’s to (the plain variable corresponding
to) the variable xfi translating the pronoun “herselfi”. In particular, let’s
assume that the LF of (70-a) is given in (71) below, where “the” is the
definite description operator (so, the LF representation of “hisj studenti” is
roughly the same as that of “the studenti of hisj”):
(71) According to Andrewj , [the xi [hej [+gen] studenti] [ti pushes herselfi]]
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Moreover, let’s assume that an indexed proper name αj is translated as a
variable “xcj” whose denotation is defined only in case the assignment assigns
to “xj” the individual rigidly denoted by the constant “c” translating α:
9
(72)
[[
xcj
]]
M,c,gs,w,t
= gs(xj) if g
s(xj) = [[c]]M,c,gs,w,t, and it’s undefined
otherwise.
We may now assume that LF (71) is translated as (73) (where R is a free
variable translating [+gen] which denotes a contextually salient relation)10
and the interpretation of “the” is specified as in (74):
(73) Bxaj (the xi (student(xi) ∧R(x
a
j , xi)) push(x
f
i , xi))
(74) a. [[the ν ΦΨ]]M,c,gs,w,t is defined only if
(i) [[Φ]]
M,c,g′s[ν→w],w,t
= 1 for exactly one g′s[ν→w] such that
g′
s[ν→w][ν]gs and
(ii) [[Ψ]]
M,c,g′s[ν→w],w,t
is defined for every g′s[ν→w]such that
g′
s[ν→w][ν]gs and [[Φ]]
M,c,g′s[ν→w],w,t
= 1.
b. if [[the ν ΦΨ]]M,c,gs,w,t is defined, then:
[[the ν ΦΨ]]M,c,gs,w,t = 1 if [[Ψ]]M,c,g′s[ν→w],w,t = 1 for every g
′s[ν→w]
such that g′s[ν→w][ν]gs and [[Φ]]
M,c,g′s[ν→w],w,t
= 1; otherwise
[[the ν ΦΨ]]M,c,gs,w,t = 0.
According to these rules, the denotation of (73) is defined only if every
student in Andrew’s belief worlds is female in those worlds, since the oper-
9In particular, we take it that the translation of indexed NPs containing proper names
works as in (i) below (where “a” is the constant translating the lexical item “Andrew”
and “xai ” a presuppositional variable whose denotation is only defined in case the variable
assignment assigns to “xi” the individual rigidly denoted by the constant “a”):
(i) NP
⇒ xai
i
N ⇒ a
Andrew ⇒ a
Since we propose that indexed proper names are translated as (a particular kind of)
variables, we assume that the option of binding them is either ruled out on pragmatic
grounds (having to do with the definedness condition on the variables translating them,
which anchors the value of the variable to a fixed individual) or by independent syntactic
principles on coindexing.
10For an analysis of possessive NPs based on this idea, see Partee (1984, 1997).
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ator “the”, being in the scope of the quantifier over possible worlds “Bxaj ”,
requires the formula “push(xfi , xi)” to be defined for every assignment min-
imally different from the context assignment that assigns to “xi” an in-
dividual who is a student of Andrew’s in Andrew’s belief worlds. Clearly,
“push(xfi , xi)” cannot be defined for any such assignment unless any student
of Andrew’s is female in Andrew’s belief worlds. Since this is how Andrew’s
belief worlds are in the context at hand, (70-a) is predicted to be fine under
the de dicto reading in (73).
On the other hand, the de dicto interpretation of (70-b), carried by trans-
lation (75) below, is predicted to be infelicitous. Indeed, since in Andrew’s
belief worlds any student of Andrew’s is female, “push(xmi , xi)” is undefined
for every assignment that assigns to “xi” an individual who is a student of
Andrew ’s in Andrew’s belief worlds.
(75) Bxaj (the xi (student(xi) ∧R(x
a
j , xi)) push(x
m
i , xi))
Notice, finally, that the de re interpretations of (70-a)-(70-b), given in (76)-
(77), are ruled out in the context described in (70), since they require that
there actually exist a student of Andrew’s, contrary to what we know.
(76) the xi (student(xi) ∧R(x
a
j , xi))(Bxaj push(x
f
i , xi))
(77) the xi (student(xi) ∧R(x
a
j , xi))(Bxaj push(x
m
i , xi))
Thus, our proposal correctly predicts the contrast in (70-a)-(70-b).
A problem for our account is raised, on the other hand, by case (78),
described by Yanovich (2010):
(78) Context: Smith College, one of the Five Colleges of Western Mas-
sachusetts, is a women’s college. Imagine that Smith has recently
gone coed, but not everyone knows about it yet, and Beth reads a
letter to some newspaper by a Smith alumna who thinks that Smith
is still a women’s college. At the same time, Beth already knows
that Smith is coed now.
a. This alumna strongly believes it should be made an absolute
principle that every Smith College studenti meet heri adviser
at least twice a week.
As Yanovich points out, (78-a) is not felicitous if uttered by Beth, who
believes that Smith is coed. This indicates that the presupposition of the
pronoun “her” cannot be satisfied in the alumna’s belief worlds, but must be
satisfied in the world of the context of utterance. According to our account,
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(78-a) is in principle ambiguous between a de dicto reading, in which the
quantifier “every Smith College studenti” is in the scope of “believe”, and
a de re reading, in which the quantifier is outside the scope of “believe”
(further types of ambiguities are in principle possible if we consider different
possible scopes of the NP “heri adviser” with respect to the intensional verb).
Under the de dicto reading of the quantifier, we predict that the denotation
of (78-a) is defined in the given context only if, in the alumna’s belief worlds,
every Smith college student is female. Thus, under the de dicto reading of
the quantifier, (78-a) does not presuppose that every Smith college student
is female in the world of the context of utterance, contrary to what seems
to be the case. Both Yanovich and Sudo suggest that this is due to the
fact that the quantifier in (78-a) is read de re, but this suggestion raises
the question of why the de re reading should be forced.11 Notice, moreover,
that it is not obvious how to represent the desired de re reading in this case:
if the quantifier “every Smith College studenti” is given wide scope with
respect to the intensional verb, the reading we obtain is a distributive one
by which the alumna has a singular belief about each Smith college student,
something which is clearly not intended by (78-a) in the given context. So,
we leave (78-a) as an open problem.
9.2 Anaphoric pronouns with non c-commanding antecedents
So far, we only considered cases in which third person pronouns are either
non anaphoric and their interpretation is provided by the extra-linguistic
context of utterance or bound by c-commanding quantifiers. How does the
theory fare with pronouns anaphoric to non c-commanding antecedents?
Consider the conditionals in (79), based on Stalnaker (1988):
(79) a. lf a woman1 had proposed the theory Copernicus proposed,
she1 would have been ignored.
b. lf Copernicus1 hadn’t existed, we would not praise him1 now.
In (79-a), the pronoun “she1” in the consequent is construed with the non
c-commanding indefinite “a woman1” in the antecedent. In (79-b), the pro-
noun “him1” in the consequent is construed with the non c-commanding
antecedent “Copernicus1” in the antecedent. As Stalnaker observes, the
pronoun in the consequent of (79-a) refers to an individual who only inhab-
its the counterfactual world(s) in which the antecedent is true, while the
11Similar cases in which wide scope is forced for descriptions in the scope of attitude
verbs are discussed in Heim (1992).
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pronoun in the consequent of (79-b) refers to a real world individual. Let’s
see how our analysis copes with these data.
Consider (79-a) first. As is well-known, the anaphoric relation in (79-a)
is either analysed as an instance of binding (Kamp 1981, Heim 1982, Groe-
nendijk and Stokhof 1991 and others) or as an instance of e-type anaphora
(Evans 1977, 1980 and others). In the latter case, the pronoun is analysed
as a definite description. Suppose we adopt the e-type analysis. Then, in
(79-a) the pronoun “she1” is presumably reconstructed at LF as the descrip-
tion “the woman who proposed t2”, where t2 denotes the theory proposed
by Copernicus in the actual world. Moreover, the description “the theory
Copernicus proposed” in (79-a) is plausibly given wide scope with respect
to the conditional operator, since there is no theory Copernicus proposed in
the counterfactual world(s) selected by the antecedent clause. Thus, (79-a)
will be represented as in (80) at LF (ignoring tense) and translated as in
(81) (where “W” translates the predicate “woman”, “P” the predicate “pro-
pose”, “I” the predicate “ignore” and “K” the complex predicate “theory
Copernicus proposed”):
(80) the2 [theory Copernicus proposes]2 [if [a1 [woman]1 [t1 proposes t2]],
[the1 [woman who proposes t2]1 [t1 is ignored]]]
(81) the x2 [K(x2)][if [a x1 W (x1) P (x2, x1)]
[the x1[W (x1) ∧ P (x2, x1)][I(x1)]]]
Let’s assume the following interpretation for the conditional operator if
(since the choice of the particular analysis of conditionals does not bear on
our problem, we adopt the simpler theory proposed by Stalnaker 1968):
(82) a. [[if ΦΨ]]c,gs,w,t is defined only if [[Ψ]]c,gs,w′,t is defined, where w
′
is the world closest to w such that [[Φ]]c,gs,w′,t = 1.
b. if [[if ΦΨ]]c,gs,w,t is defined, then:
[[if ΦΨ]]c,gs,w,t = 1 if [[Ψ]]c,gs,w′,t = 1, where w
′ is the world
closest to w such that [[Φ]]c,gs,w′,t = 1; otherwise [[if ΦΨ]]c,gs,w,t
= 0.
E-type theories of anaphora usually assume that indefinite DPs of the form
[DP a(n) NP] are quantificational and introduce an existential quantifier.
In our terms, this assumption may be stated thus (we also assume that the
definedness condition of indefinites, unlike that of universal quantifiers, gives
rise to existential presuppositions):12
12For the assumption concerning existential presuppositions of indefinites, see Sudo
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(83) a. [[a ν ΦΨ]]M,c,gs,w,t is defined only if [[Ψ]]M,c,g′s[ν→w],w,t is defined
for some g′s[ν→w] such that g′s[ν→w][ν]gs and [[Φ]]
M,c,g′s[ν→w],w,t
= 1.
b. if [[a ν ΦΨ]]M,c,gs,w,t is defined, then:
[[a ν ΦΨ]]M,c,gs,w,t = 1 if [[Ψ]]M,c,g′s[ν→w],w,t = 1 for some g
′s[ν→w]
such that g′s[ν→w][ν]gs and [[Φ]]
M,c,g′s[ν→w],w,t
= 1; otherwise
[[a ν ΦΨ]]M,c,gs,w,t = 0.
By the analysis of definite descriptions proposed in (74), we expect, what is
correct, that the description corresponding to the pronoun “she1” in (79-a)
should be satisfied in the closest world in which a woman proposed the
theory that Copernicus actually proposed:
(84) [[(81)]]M,c,csg ,cw,ct is defined only if
(i) [[K(x2)]]M,c,g′s[x2→cw ],cw,ct=1 for exactly one g
′s[x2→cw] such that
g′
s[x2→cw][x2]c
s
g and
(ii) [[if [a x1 W (x1)P (x2, x1)][the x1[W (x1) ∧ P (x2, x1)][I(x1)]]]]M,c,g′s[x2→cw ],cw,ct
is defined for every g′s[x2→cw] such that
g′
s[x2→cw][x2]c
s
g and [[K(x2)]]M,c,g′s[x2→cw ],cw,ct=1
only if (i) and for every g′s[x2→cw] such that g′s[x2→cw][x2]c
s
g and
[[K(x2)]]M,c,g′s[x2→cw ],cw,ct=1,
[[the x1[W (x1) ∧ P (x2, x1)][I(x1)]]]M,c,g′s[x2→cw ],w′,ct is defined, where
w′ is the world closest to cw in which
[[a x1 W (x1)P (x2, x1)]]M,c,g′s[x2→cw ],w′,ct = 1
only if (i) and for every g′s[x2→cw] such that g′s[x2→cw][x2]c
s
g and
[[K(x2)]]M,c,g′s[x2→cw ],cw,ct = 1,
[[W (x1) ∧ P (x2, x1)]]M,c,g′′s[x2→cw,x1→w′],w′,ct = 1
for exactly one g′′s[x2→cw,x1→w
′] such that g′′s[x2→cw,x1→w
′][x1]g
′s[x2→cw]
and [[I(x1)]]M,c,g′′s[x2→cw,x1→w′],w′,ct is defined for every g
′′s[x2→cw,x1→w
′]
such that g′′s[x2→cw,x1→w
′][x1]g
′s[x2→cw] and
[[W (x1) ∧ P (x2, x1)]]M,c,g′′s[x2→cw,x1→w′],w′,ct = 1
only if there is exactly one theory Copernicus proposes in cw and
in the world w′ closest to cw in which a woman proposes the theory
Copernicus proposes in cw, there is exactly one woman who proposes
the theory Copernicus proposes in cw.
2012, 2013b and references cited therein.
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Now let’s suppose instead that the anaphoric relation in (79-a) is an in-
stance of binding. We will sketch one such analysis based on the assumption
that indefinites are non quantificational and are translated as open formulae
(Heim 1982, Kamp 1981).13 Let’s assume with Heim that, at LF, indefinite
DPs copy their index on the conditional operator. In this case, (79-a) will
be represented at LF as (85) (ignoring tense) and translated as (86):
(85) the2 [theory Copernicus proposes]2 [if1 [a [woman]1 [t1 proposes t2]],
[she1 is ignored]]
(86) the x2 [K(x2)][ifx1 [W (x1) ∧ P (x2, x1)][I(x
f
1)]]
The interpretation of the conditional operator may now be stated as in (87)
below (when no indices are copied on the if -operator, clause (87) reduces to
(82)):14
(87) a.
[[
ifνi...νj ΦΨ
]]
c,gs,w,t
is defined only if [[Ψ]]
c,g′
s[νi→w
′,...,νj→w
′]
,w′,t
is defined for every w′ which is the world closest to w such that
[[∃νi . . . νjΦ]]c,gs,w′,t = 1 and for every g
′s[νi→w
′,...,νj→w
′] such
that g′s[νi→w
′,...,νj→w
′][νi, . . . , νj ]g
s and
[[Φ]]
c,g′
s[νi→w
′,...,νj→w
′]
,w′,t
=1.
b. if
[[
ifνi...νj ΦΨ
]]
c,gs,w,t
is defined, then:
[[
ifνi...νj ΦΨ
]]
c,gs,w,t
= 1 if [[Ψ]]
c,g′
s[νi→w
′,...,νj→w
′]
,w′,t
= 1 for ev-
ery w′ which is the world closest to w such that
[[∃νi . . . νjΦ]]c,gs,w′,t = 1 and for every g
′s[νi→w
′,...,νj→w
′] such
that g′s[νi→w
′,...,νj→w
′][νi, . . . , νj ]g
s and [[Φ]]
c,g′
s[νi→w
′,...,νj→w
′]
,w′,t
= 1; otherwise
[[
ifνi...νj ΦΨ
]]
c,gs,w,t
= 0.
13Another option, which we don’t pursue here, is that indefinites introduce dynamic
existential quantifiers, as in Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991) and others.
14We assume that the denotation of “∃νi . . . νjΦ” is defined as follows:
(i) a. [[∃νi . . . νjΦ]]M,c,gs,w,t is defined only if [[Φ]]M,c,g′s[νi→w,...,νj→w],w,t is defined
for some g′
s[νi→w,...,νj→w] such that g′
s[νi→w,...,νj→w][νi, . . . , νj ]g
s.
b. if [[∃ν Φ]]
M,c,gs,w,t
is defined, then:
[[∃νi . . . νjΦ]]M,c,gs,w,t = 1 if [[Φ]]M,c,g′s[νi→w,...,νj→w],w,t = 1 for some
g′
s[νi→w,...,νj→w] such that g′
s[νi→w,...,νj→w][νi, . . . , νj ]g
s; otherwise
[[∃ν Φ]]
M,c,gs,w,t
= 0.
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Again, by this analysis, we correctly predict that the descriptive content of
the pronoun “she1” in (79-a) should be satisfied in the closest world in which
a woman proposed the theory that Copernicus actually proposed:
(88) [[(86)]]M,c,csg ,cw,ct is defined only if
(i) [[K(x2)]]M,c,g′s[x2→cw ],cw,ct=1 for exactly one g
′s[x2→cw] such that
g′
s[x2→cw][x2]c
s
g and
(ii)
[[
ifx1 [W (x1) ∧ P (x2, x1)][I(x
f
1)]
]]
M,c,g′s[x2→cw ],cw,ct
is defined for
every g′s[x2→cw] such that g′s[x2→cw][x2]c
s
g and
[[K(x2)]]M,c,g′s[x2→cw ],cw,ct=1
only if (i) and for every g′s[x2→cw] such that g′s[x2→cw][x2]c
s
g and
[[K(x2)]]M,c,g′s[x2→cw ],cw,ct=1,
[[
I(xf1)
]]
M,c,g′′s[x2→cw,x1→w
′],w′,ct
is de-
fined for every w′ which is the world closest to cw such that
[[∃νi . . . νjΦ]]c,g′s[x2→cw ],w′,t = 1 and every g
′′s[x2→cw,x1→w
′] such that
g′′
s[x2→cw,x1→w′][x1]g
′s[x2→cw] and
[[W (x1) ∧ P (x2, x1)]]M,c,g′′s[x2→cw,x1→w′],w′,ct = 1
only if (i) and for every g′s[x2→cw] such that g′s[x2→cw][x2]c
s
g and
[[K(x2)]]M,c,g′s[x2→cw ],cw,ct=1, g
′′s[x2→cw,x1→w
′](x1) is female in w
′ for
every w′ which is the world closest to cw such that
[[∃νi . . . νjΦ]]c,g′s[x2→cw ],w′,t = 1 and every g
′′s[x2→cw,x1→w
′] such that
g′′
s[x2→cw,x1→w′][x1]g
′s[x2→cw] and
[[W (x1) ∧ P (x2, x1)]]M,c,g′′s[x2→cw,x1→w′],w′,ct = 1
only if there is exactly one theory Copernicus proposes in cw and
for every individual and every world w′ such that the individual is
a woman who proposes in w′ the theory Copernicus proposes in cw
and w′ is the world closest to cw in which a woman proposes the
theory Copernicus proposes in cw, the individual is female in w
′.
Consider now conditional (79-b):
(79) b. lf Copernicus1 hadn’t existed, we would not praise him1 now.
According to our assumption about proper names in the previous section,
(79-b) is translated as (89) (for simplicity, we ignore tense and the time in-
dexical “now”, and we assume that “k” is the individual constant translating
the proper name “Copernicus”):
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(89) if ∼E(xk1) ∼P (we, x
m
1 )
Assuming interpretation (82) for the conditional operator, we derive the
definedness conditions in (90-a) for (89):
(90) a.
[[
if ∼E(xk1) ∼P (we, x
m
1 )
]]
M,c,csg ,cw,ct
is defined only if
[[∼P (we, xm1 )]]M,c,csg ,w′,ct is defined, where w
′ is the world closest
to cw such that
[[
∼E(xk1)
]]
M,c,csg ,w
′,ct
=1
only if csg(x1) is male in cw = s(x1) and c
s
g(x1) is identical to
Copernicus.
b. if
[[
if ∼E(xk1) ∼P (we, x
m
1 )
]]
M,c,csg ,cw,ct
is defined, then[[
if ∼E(xk1) ∼P (we, x
m
1 )
]]
M,c,csg ,cw,ct
= 1
if [[∼P (we, xm1 )]]M,c,csg ,w′,ct =1 , where w
′ is the world closest to
cw such that
[[
∼E(xk1)
]]
M,c,csg ,w
′,ct
=1
if csg(x1) is male in cw = s(x1), we do not praise c
s
g(x1) in w
′,
where w′ is the world closest to cw such that c
s
g(x1) is identical
to Copernicus and csg(x1) does not inhabit w
′.
According to (90-a), for formula (89) translating (79-b) to be defined, the
contextual assignment must assign to the pronoun “him1” an individual
who is male in the world of the context and identical to Copernicus. Since
Copernicus is a man in the context of utterance of (79-b), the condition is
met.
If the above observations are correct, our proposal accounts for the inter-
pretation of anaphoric pronouns with non c-commanding antecedents in the
conditionals in (79): the behaviour of these pronouns in (79) is consistent
with our assumption concerning the role of quantifiers in shifting the modal
component of the assignment.
Notice, by the way, that the account we propose for the behavior of pro-
nouns anaphoric to proper names can also explain cases in which pronouns
occur in the scope of attitude verbs while being anaphoric to proper names.
Consider for instance the following discourse, based on Sharvit (2008):
(91) Johni didn’t realize that Billj was male. John thought that hej\*shej
liked himi.
Sharvit’s observation is that it is odd to use “she” in this discourse. Our
proposal predicts the oddness of the female pronoun in (91), since it requires
that the descriptive content of “shej” be satisfied by Bill in the world of the
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context of utterance of (91).
We conclude by pointing out an open problem for our proposal. Consider
case (92), based on Yanovich (2010):
(92) Context: The Russian name “Sasha” can be used for both male and
female individuals. Suppose that I plan to visit some old friends of
mine. I know that they have a kid and that the name of the kid is
“Sasha”, but I do not know whether it is a girl or a boy.
a. ??Tomorrow, I’ll see Sasha1. I’ll kiss him1.
b. ??Tomorrow, I’ll see Sasha1. I’ll kiss her1.
Our account can explain the infelicity of (92-a)-(92-b) in the following way.
Suppose that (92-a)-(92-b) are translated, respectively, as (93-a)-(93-b) (ig-
noring the tense and the time adverb):
(93) a. visit(xs1, I) ∧ kiss(x
m
1 , I)
b. visit(xs1, I) ∧ kiss(x
f
1 , I)
According to our theory, (93-a)-(93-b) are true in a context if they are
true with respect to the assignment of the context, false if they are false
with respect to that assignment. No matter how we specify the definedness
conditions for conjoined formulae, (93-a) is only defined for assignments that
assign to the variable x1 an individual who is male and is identical to Sasha
in the world of the context, while (93-b) is only defined for assignments
that assign to the variable x1 an individual who is female and is identical to
Sasha in the world of the context. Based on Soames (1989) and Sudo (2012),
we introduce the following bridge principle relating the semantic notion of
presupposition to the pragmatic one:15
(94) If, in order for the denotation of S to be defined in a context c, p
must be the case in the world of c, then, for S to be felicitously
uttered in c, the conversational background of c must entail p.
Since, in the context described in (92), the sex of Sasha is not known,
the conversational background entails neither that Sasha is female nor that
Sasha is male, thus (92-a) and (92-b) are now predicted to be infelicitous in
that context.16
15The same principle was implicitly at work in the explanation we proposed for the
infelicity of (51) and (65).
16More generally, the infelicity of (92-a)-(92-b) uttered in the context described in (92)
may be seen as following from a precondition for the illocutionary act of assertion. Ac-
cording to our theory, (93-a) is true in a context only if Sasha is male in the world of
38
F. Del Prete - S. Zucchi Monsters begat by quantifiers?
Consider, however, the conditionals in (95), uttered in the same context:
(95) a. If Sasha1 is male, I’ll buy him1 a doll.
b. If Sasha2 is female, I’ll buy her2 a toy car.
Sentences (95-a)-(95-b) are both felicitous in that context. Yet, given our
semantics, these sentences should behave like conditional (79-b) above. In
particular, (95-a) should only be defined for assignments that assign to the
variable x1 an individual who is male and is identical to Sasha in the world
of the context, and (95-b) should only be defined for assignments that assign
to the variable x2 an individual who is female and is identical to Sasha in the
world of the context. Thus, for (95-a) to be defined, Sasha must be male
in the world of the context and, for (95-b) to be defined, Sasha must be
female in the world of the context. Since, in the context described in (92),
we do not know Sasha’s sex, the conversational background of the context
fails to entail that Sasha is male and fails to entail that Sasha is female,
thus (95-a)-(95-b) are incorrectly predicted to be infelicitous. We leave this
as an open problem for our account.
10 Conclusions
Kaplan’s (1977) goal was to provide a semantics for demonstrative uses of
third person pronouns and other indexicals. Bound variable uses of third
person pronouns were explicitly excluded from his investigation. Indeed, Ka-
plan suggested that demonstrative and bound variable uses of “he” involve
distinct lexical items that happen to be homonyms:
. . . I began my investigations by asking what is said when a
speaker points at someone and says, “He is suspicious”. The
word ‘he’, so used, is a demonstrative. . .
The group of words for which I propose a semantical theory
includes the pronouns ‘I’, ‘my’, ‘you’, ‘he’, ‘his’, ‘she’, ‘it’, the
the context, while (93-b) is true in a context only if Sasha is female in the world of the
context. Searle (1974) suggests that assertion must conform to this preparatory rule: the
speaker must be in a position to provide evidence or reasons for the truth of the sentence
asserted. Applied to (92), this means that, if a speaker asserts (92-a), then she must be
in a position to provide evidence that Sasha is male and, if a speaker asserts (92-b), then
she must be in a position to provide evidence that Sasha is female. Given that in the
context described in (92) the sex of Sasha is not known, neither (92-a) nor (92-b) can
be asserted in that context, since the speaker has no evidence that either one is true. A
similar account may be proposed for (51) and (65).
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demonstrative pronouns ‘that’, ‘this’, the adverbs ‘here’, ‘now’,
‘tomorrow’, ‘yesterday’, the adjectives ‘actual’, ‘present’, and
others. These words have uses other than those in which I am in-
terested (or, perhaps, depending on how you individuate words,
we should say that they have homonyms in which I am not in-
terested). For example, the pronouns ‘he’ and ‘his’ are used not
as demonstratives but as bound variables in
For what is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole
world, and lose his own soul?
(Kaplan 1977, pp. 489-90)
As we pointed out at the start, the hypothesis that demonstrative and
bound variable uses of “he” involve distinct lexical items leaves unexplained
why in language after language the same phonological word is used both as
a demonstrative and as a bound variable. This observation provides a good
reason not to concede the homonym hypothesis, or at least not to concede
it without putting up a fight. In this paper, we assumed that Kaplan, when
uttering a demonstrative “he”, and the Son, nay King James’s translator,
when uttering a bound pronoun “he”, were uttering the same word both
from a phonological and from a semantic point of view, not just homonyms.
We explored an account of the semantics of this word which does not re-
quire quantifiers to be monsters and which is based on the idea that variable
assignments occur both as coordinates of the context and as coordinates of
the circumstance of evaluation. According to this account, non anaphoric
free third-person pronouns are no longer indexical in Kaplan’s sense: as for
its reference, a third-person pronoun depends on a coordinate of the circum-
stance of evaluation, i.e. on the variable assignment gs of the circumstance,
and not directly on any aspect of the context. The fact that its value ends
up being determined by the context is a byproduct of the definition of truth
in a context, that equates the variable assignment of the context with the
variable assignment of the circumstance. In MacFarlane’s (2009) terms, this
amounts to saying that non anaphoric free third-person pronouns are context
sensitive, since they have different denotations relative to different contexts
of use, but not indexical, since their content does not vary from context to
context. The fact that the denotation of third person pronouns depends on
the assignment coordinate of the circumstance opens up the possibility that
third person pronouns may not have a contextually determined reference
whenever they are in the scope of operators that shift the assignment of the
circumstance. We argued that quantifiers are such operators.
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We proposed that, for an account of this sort to work properly (in partic-
ular, for it to avoid generating unwanted indexical presuppositions for bound
pronouns), one should assume that variable assignments have a modal com-
ponent, and thus they perform two tasks: not only do they assign individuals
to variables but they also assign worlds to variables (that is, to each variable
ν they associate information concerning the “modal localization” of the in-
dividual assigned to ν). We tested the empirical coverage of the theory and
we saw that it accounts for several core cases of interaction of pronouns with
intensional operators. As it might be expected, we also found some cases in
which the theory needs to be refined further.
Acknowledgements
To be written.
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Appendix 1: The formal system
In this appendix, we state the formal system in its final form.
The intensional language IL
Symbols
c1, c2, c3, . . . (individual constants)
x1, x2, x3, . . . (plain variables)
xm1 , x
m
2 , x
m
3 , . . . (presuppositional variables)
x
f
1 , x
f
2 , x
f
3 , . . . (presuppositional variables)
xn1 , x
n
2 , x
n
3 , . . . (presuppositional variables)
xc11 , x
c2
1 , x
c3
1 ,. . .x
c1
2 , x
c2
2 , x
c3
2 , . . . (presuppositional variables)
P 11 , P
1
2 , . . . , P
2
1 , P
2
2 . . . (predicates)
∧, ∼, ∨, every, the, a, if , ✸, ✷, B, believe, E (logical constants)
Formulae Let V be the set of plain variables and V∗ the set of variables
(plain and presuppositional).
1. If Pn is an n-place predicate and τi, . . . τj are n terms (variables or
constants), Pn(τi, . . . τj) is a wff.
2. If Φ and Ψ are wffs, then p∼ Φq, pΦ ∧ Ψq, pΦ ∨ Ψq pif ΦΨq, p✸Φq,
p✷Φq are wffs.
3. if Φ and Ψ are wffs and ν ∈ V, pevery ν ΦΨq, pthe ν ΦΨq, pa ν ΦΨq
are wffs.
4. If τ is a term and Φ is a wff, pBτΦq is a wff.
5. If τ is a term and Φ is a wff, pbelieve(τ,Φ)q is a wff.
6. If τ is a term, pE(τ)q is a wff.
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Models A model for IL is a structure M =< C,W,U , T ,P, I,F >, where
1. C is a nonempty set (the set of contexts), where if c ∈ C,
(i) ca ∈ U (the agent of c)
(ii) ct ∈ T (the time of c)
(iii) cp ∈ P (the position of c)
(iv) cw ∈ W (the world of c)
(v) csg ∈ U
V (the assignment of c), where s ∈ WV and s(ν) = cw for
every ν ∈ V.
(vi) cR ∈ W ×W (an accessibility relation).
2. W is a nonempty set (the set of worlds)
3. U is a nonempty set (the set of individuals)
4. T is a nonempty set (the set of times)
5. P is a nonempty set (the set of positions)
6. I ∈ ℘(U)W (a function that assigns to each world w ∈ W the set of
individuals in U inhabiting world w)
7. F is a function that to every triple consisting of an n-place predicate
P
n, a world, and a time, assigns a set of n-tuples of members of U , and
to every individual constant assigns a member of U .
Denotation The denotation of an expression is relative to a model, a
context of utterance, and a circumstance of evaluation consisting of a world,
a time, and a variable assignment gs, where gs ∈ UV and s ∈ WV .
We use “[[α]]M,c,gs,w,t” as short for “the denotation of α in the context c
relative to the circumstance < gs, w, t >”.
We use “g′s[νi→w,...,νj→w
′][νi, . . . , νj ]g
s” as short for “the assignment
g′
s[νi→w,...,νj→w
′] is identical to gs except for the fact that (i) g′s[νi→w,...,νj→w
′]
may differ from gs because its modal component assigns the world w to the
variable νi, . . . , and the world w
′ to the variable νj and (ii) g
′s[νi→w,...,νj→w
′]
may differ from gs for the individuals assigned to νi, . . . , νj”.
Here we specify the denotations for a selected set of expressions:
1. [[ci]]M,c,gs,w,t = F(ci).
2. [[Pn]]M,c,gs,w,t = F(P
n)(w)(t).
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3. [[xi]]M,c,gs,w,t = g
s(xi), where g
s(xi) ∈ I(s(xi)) (i.e., the individual
gs(xi) inhabits the world s(xi)).
4. [[xmi ]]M,c,gs,w,t = g
s(xi) if g
s(xi) is human and male in s(xi), and it’s
undefined otherwise.
5.
[[
x
f
i
]]
M,c,gs,w,t
= gs(xi) if g
s(xi) is human and female in s(xi), and it’s
undefined otherwise.
6. [[xni ]]M,c,gs,w,t = g
s(xi) if g
s(xi) is non human in s(xi), and it’s unde-
fined otherwise.
7. [[xcii ]]M,c,gs,w,t = g
s(xi) if g
s(xi) = [[ci]]M,c,gs,w,t, and it’s undefined oth-
erwise.
8. Suppose [[τi]]M,c,gs,w,t, . . . , [[τj ]]M,c,gs,w,t are defined.
Then [[Pn(τi, . . . , τj)]]M,c,gs,w,t = 1 if< [[τi]]M,c,gs,w,t, . . . , [[τj ]]M,c,gs,w,t >∈
F(Pn)(w)(t);
[[Pn(τi, . . . , τj)]]M,c,gs,w,t = 0 if < [[τi]]M,c,gs,w,t, . . . , [[τj ]]M,c,gs,w,t > 6∈
F(Pn)(w)(t).
9. (a) [[every ν ΦΨ]]M,c,gs,w,t is defined only if [[Ψ]]M,c,g′s[ν→w],w,t is de-
fined for every g′s[ν→w] such that g′s[ν→w][ν]gs and [[Φ]]
M,c,g′s[ν→w],w,t
=
1.
(b) if [[every ν ΦΨ]]M,c,gs,w,t is defined, then:
[[every ν ΦΨ]]M,c,gs,w,t = 1 if [[Ψ]]M,c,g′s[ν→w],w,t = 1 for every
g′
s[ν→w] such that g′s[ν→w][ν]gs and [[Φ]]
M,c,g′s[ν→w],w,t
= 1;
otherwise [[every ν ΦΨ]]M,c,gs,w,t = 0.
10. (a) [[the ν ΦΨ]]M,c,gs,w,t is defined only if
(i) [[Φ]]
M,c,g′s[ν→w],w,t
= 1 for exactly one g′s[ν→w] such that g′s[ν→w][ν]gs
and
(ii) [[Ψ]]
M,c,g′s[ν→w],w,t
is defined for every g′s[ν→w] such that g′s[ν→w][ν]gs
and [[Φ]]
M,c,g′s[ν→w],w,t
= 1.
(b) if [[the ν ΦΨ]]M,c,gs,w,t is defined, then:
[[the ν ΦΨ]]M,c,gs,w,t = 1 if [[Ψ]]M,c,g′s[ν→w],w,t = 1 for every g
′s[ν→w]
such that g′s[ν→w][ν]gs and [[Φ]]
M,c,g′s[ν→w],w,t
= 1;
otherwise [[the ν ΦΨ]]M,c,gs,w,t = 0.
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11. (a) [[a ν ΦΨ]]M,c,gs,w,t is defined only if [[Ψ]]M,c,g′s[ν→w],w,t is defined
for some g′s[ν→w] such that g′s[ν→w][ν]gs and [[Φ]]
M,c,g′s[ν→w],w,t
= 1.
(b) if [[a ν ΦΨ]]M,c,gs,w,t is defined, then:
[[a ν ΦΨ]]M,c,gs,w,t = 1 if [[Ψ]]M,c,g′s[ν→w],w,t = 1 for some g
′s[ν→w]
such that g′s[ν→w][ν]gs and [[Φ]]
M,c,g′s[ν→w],w,t
= 1;
otherwise [[a ν ΦΨ]]M,c,gs,w,t = 0.
12. (a) [[✸ϕ]]M,c,gs,w,t is defined only if [[ϕ]]M,c,gs,w′,t is defined for all w
′ ∈
W such that w cR w
′.
(b) if [[✸ϕ]]M,c,gs,w,t is defined, then:
[[✸ϕ]]M,c,gs,w,t = 1 if [[ϕ]]M,c,gs,w′,t = 1, for some w
′ ∈ W such that
w cR w
′;
[[✸ϕ]]M,c,gs,w,t = 0 if [[ϕ]]M,c,gs,w′,t = 0, for all w
′ ∈ W such that
w cR w
′.
13. (a) [[if ΦΨ]]c,gs,w,t is defined only if [[Ψ]]c,gs,w′,t is defined, where w
′ is
the world closest to w such that [[Φ]]c,gs,w′,t = 1.
(b) if [[if ΦΨ]]c,gs,w,t is defined, then:
[[if ΦΨ]]c,gs,w,t = 1 if [[Ψ]]c,gs,w′,t = 1,where w
′ is the world closest
to w such that [[Φ]]c,gs,w′,t = 1; otherwise [[if ΦΨ]]c,gs,w,t = 0.
14. (a) [[Bτϕ]]M,c,gs,w,t is defined only if [[ϕ]]M,c,gs,w′,t is defined for every
w′ ∈ W which is a belief world of [[τ ]]M,c,gs,w,t in w.
(b) if [[Bτϕ]]M,c,gs,w,t is defined, then:
[[Bτϕ]]M,c,gs,w,t = 1 if [[ϕ]]M,c,gs,w′,t = 1, for every w
′ ∈ W which
is a belief world of [[τ ]]M,c,gs,w,t in w;
[[Bτϕ]]M,c,gs,w,t = 0 if [[ϕ]]M,c,gs,w′,t = 0, for some w
′ ∈ W which is
a belief world of [[τ ]]M,c,gs,w,t in w.
15. (a) [[believe(τ, ϕ)]]M,c,gs,w,t is defined only if [[ϕ]]M,c,gs,w′,t is defined,
for every w′ ∈ W which is a belief world of [[τ ]]M,c,gs,w,t in w
(b) if [[believe(τ, ϕ)]]M,c,gs,w,t is defined, then:
[[believe(τ, ϕ)]]M,c,gs,w,t = 1 if [[ϕ]]M,c,gs,w′,t = 1, for every w
′ ∈ W
which is a belief world of [[τ ]]M,c,gs,w,t in w;
[[believe(τ, ϕ)]]M,c,gs,w,t = 0 if [[ϕ]]M,c,gs,w′,t = 0, for some w
′ ∈ W
which is a belief world of [[τ ]]M,c,gs,w,t in w.
16. [[E(τ)]]M,c,gs,w,t = 1 if [[τ ]]M,c,gs,w,t ∈ I(w); [[E(τ)]]M,c,gs,w,t = 0 if
[[τ ]]M,c,gs,w,t ∈ I(w).
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Truth in context
• Φ is true in a context c, in the model M , if [[Φ]]M,c,csg ,cw,ct = 1
• Φ is false in a context c, in the model M, if [[Φ]]M,c,csg ,cw,ct = 0
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